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GERMANY AFTER WORLD WAR II – CRUCIAL
FRONTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WAR
The victorious allied countries divided Europe into parts after the end of World
War II. This caused defeated Germany to become a point of contact between the two
great ideological blocs. On both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain enormous land army
units were placed, together with aircraft military groups and naval ships. The most im-
portant everyday mission performed on the border between the cold and the hot war
was, however, the one fulfilled by forces which belonged to a less visible but still ex-
tremely important formation – namely the Intelligence Services, Counter-intelligence
Services and, above all, their agents and analysts. While a cold-war tension was rising
and the two German states were built, a territory of the current Federal Republic of Ger-
many turned into one of the biggest fronts of world espionage. Divided Germany was
a witness not only of a game led by the two biggest American and Soviet Intelligence
Services, which was of the greatest importance from a global point of view, but also
witnessed many minor clashes of other Intelligence Agencies. Germany’s major focus
fell mainly on offensive intelligence actions but defensive Counter-intelligence Ser-
vices were also an important object of Germany’s attention.
An icon of Cold War espionage was Berlin, a divided into four occupation zones
city situated in East Germany and governed by the former allied powers. Berlin-based
operations were multidimensional, since infiltration and intelligence actions encom-
passed all areas of functioning of the two German states. Besides, other countries
whose military, political and economic interests were in close connection with Ger-
many were also a subject of intelligence activities. What formed a basis for these ac-
tions was undoubtedly military espionage, directed on collecting new data pertaining to
military potential of a possible enemy, who could gather on the most important arena
of European politics. When a spectre of a regular war was pushed away, politi-
cally-focused espionage gained in significance. At a later time more focus was given
also to economic espionage, mainly because of a rapid development of West German
industry. Apart from the aforementioned fields of intelligence craftsmanship, both the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
were arenas of many unconventional actions which nowadays can be observed e.g. in
Afghanistan or some African regions. The then spies and spies-catchers were given
a free hand in plenty of cases. Today, after the German reunification into a single national
being and Germany taking the lead in the European Union, one may assume that this
kind of intelligence activities has weakened. Such a thesis is not valid, however, since
new information, important for the Germany’s national interest, concerning new threats
with regard to intelligence and counter-intelligence have been coming to the surface.
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Therefore, the aim of this paper is to outline major fields of a war or, more precisely,
many individual wars between Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Services which
are connected with Germany, either in a territorial or an institutional way. At the
same time, possible threats and challenges posed to German Intelligence and Coun-
ter-intelligence Services at the beginning of the 20th century will be presented.
What needs to be emphasised first are, however, difficulties in a process of collect-
ing necessary data. This stems from a fact that the majority of official documents per-
taining to intelligence and counter-intelligence activities is secret in character. Even
after a long period of time, these documents have not yet been made fully public, since
many methods and solutions applied in the past have been, despite technological prog-
ress, used until now. What is more, publically available materials need to be critically
assessed, since their primary aim may be, and undoubtedly usually is, to misinform po-
tential enemies. Asignificant contribution to understanding of a cold-war clash of Intel-
ligence Services on a German front was brought by a disclosure of East Germany
materials of Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS.1
ESPIONAGE – GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOPIC
The very notion of intelligence actions, in relations not only between nations and
states but also in business, is nothing new and did not emerge along with the Cold War.
Needless to say that, since the Ancient Times, espionage has been perceived as a natural
element in world’s functioning processes. This element was rather hidden though; it be-
longed more to the seamy side of life. It is also difficult to pinpoint the very moment in
history which can be regarded as a beginning of espionage, since in many ancient cul-
tures one can find treatises, books and legends full of descriptions of intelligence and
espionage actions of various types. It is enough to mention that the Bible contains an
entire excerpt about the actions taken by complex spy rings. In a biblical context the
most telling is a case of activities fulfilled by order of Joshua. It is exactly in the Book of
Joshua where one can read that “Joshua, son of Nun secretly sent two spies from Shit-
tim. «Go, look over the land», he said, «especially Jericho»”.2 The clearest example of
a role of espionage comes, however, from Asia. The case of the ancient China is the one
which, in fact, has still remained valid. A Chinese sage and a military mandarin Sun
Tzu, considered one of the fathers of a tactical and strategic thought, addressed in his
treatise “The Art of War” some problematic issues concerning the employment of spies.
Sun Tzu wrote: “Wise rulers and capable commanders win because they have advance
information about the enemy. Such fore-knowledge cannot be obtained from ghosts and
spirits, cannot be had from analogous experiences, cannot be found by calculating the
positions of the sun, the moon and stare. It must be obtained from the people who
clearly know the enemy’s situations”.3 At the same time Sun Tzu described five kinds
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of spies: local spies, internal spies, double spies, dead spies, and living spies. The
so-called local spies are recruited from the inhabitants of a particular territory. Their ma-
jor advantage is a capability of an easy and natural melting into an infiltrated community.
Sun Tzu considers local spies capable of deep infiltration of a local population by means
of gathering informers and spies to spy on broadly understood decisive circles of a chosen
target. Of course, a category of a double spy concerns a re-recruitment process of an agent
who was originally sent by an enemy. In this case, it is important to stress a possibility
that, apart from a simple re-recruitment, complex actions may occur. Then, a re-recruited
agent is once again re-recruited. Dead spies are, in a contemporary understanding, coun-
terfeit personal sources of information for an enemy. Their aim is to establish a relation and
to co-operate with a hostile intelligence or counter-intelligence services in order to con-
duct disinformation operations.4 Living spies are, in fact, typical operational agents who
are able to pass a message obtained in a hostile territory to their own intelligence centre.
When considering a role of intelligence in the contemporary world one must admit
that it is a constant process of collecting information, often secret in character, by
means of various methods, by both national and non-national subjects. Espionage is, in
turn, a very activity implemented by espionage agencies. Intelligence means not only
collecting data; it means also to analyse and to process collected data into an intelli-
gence assessment necessary for politicians, military men, and scientists. Intelligence is
also an attempt to create a stable system of a backstage shaping of the environment in
order to complete one’s own goals. However, apart from a direction to collect data, an
intelligence process is connected also with a direction to misinform, so to send counter-
feit or partially counterfeit messages in order to weaken capacity of a potential enemy.
Intelligence always encounters its enemy in the form of counter-intelligence. There-
fore, individual countries or even larger business structures, e.g. international corpora-
tions, develop right since the beginning not only their own intelligence cells but also
defensive counter-intelligence cells. There are many modes of categorisation and clas-
sification of intelligence or, to narrow the scope, espionage. The most widely known is
the one based on a sources of information. Then one can use a notion of so-called white
intelligence, based on publically available information and official sources, e. g. news-
papers, declassified documents, television, radio, and contemporary also social net-
working sites or, generally speaking, the Internet. Apart from white intelligence one
can also distinguish grey intelligence, operating at the meeting point of public and se-
cret information, with the latter collected against the will of a spied-on subject. The
most recognisable type of intelligence is so-called black intelligence, based on a pro-
cess of stealing information and collecting data in an illegal way. There is a rule saying
that both enemies and allies spy on each other. What is more, espionage as a process is
not a procedure activated only in the periods of danger. It rather operates all the time in
order to foresee possible crises. Apart from black, grey and white intelligence one
should mention a important division into the so-called HUMINT, SIGINT, TECHINT,
and TELINT. HUMINT5 is a type of personal intelligence which can be described as the
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most primitive form of human intelligence activities. SIGINT6 is a type of intelligence
based on monitoring the collected material and data about technologies an enemy has at
his disposal. Today, a scope of operations led by TECHINT7 has been widened because
of a development in digital and satellite technologies. TELINT8 is, in fact, a subtype of
TECHINT, focused particularly on collecting and analysing foreign telemetric data.
One can distinguish also a political, military and industrial intelligence. What needs to
be stated, however, is the fact that nowadays the borders between intelligence activities
both strictly political or strictly industrial in type have become blurred. To conclude, in-
telligence is a phenomenon which functions steadily in the contemporary world. It is
a complex form of investigating aims and capabilities of potential enemies, non-aligned
subjects, and allies.
THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR –GERMANY AS A SUBJECT
The last days of World War II and the initial months after its end were, for a territory
of the defeated Third Reich, a time of violent, often even brutal clashes of various intel-
ligence forces. The major role in these strive was played by the special units of Soviet
Counter-intelligence Military Services called Spiecjalnyje Mietody Rozob³aczenija
Szpionow – better known as SMIERSZ, the units of Soviet Intelligence Services
Narodny komissariat vnutrennikh del NKWD9 the special units of American Office of
Strategic Services (OSS),10 the British units of Special Operations Executive (SOE).
The aim of the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities on German territories oc-
cupied by the Allies was to gather people and collect scientific and technical infrastruc-
ture. The major stress was put on highly developed technologies of the German V-1
missiles or the first ballistic missiles V-2. However, German achievements in a field of
jet-powered and rocket-powered engines, as well as submarines, including the biggest
U-Boots, e.g. type IX D, were no less important. Intelligence Services competed with
each other also in a task to regain the precious Nazi spoils of war: gold and artwork col-
lections. Of course, catching important German officers and dignitaries by the allied in-
telligence forces was a very foundation for this process. It is justified to assume that the
aforementioned activities were not always strictly connected with catching Nazi war
criminals, since more precious seemed either engineers or former Abwehra’s agents,
Sicherheitsdienst SD’s agents or Gestapo. The activities of the major allied Intelligence
Services were interrupted by the activities of the German spy and intelligence rings,
whose major aim was, in a face of a fall of the Third Reich, to protect the former Nazi
establishment members and their evacuation to safe countries, mainly located in South
America. These missions were fulfilled, among others, by a famous Organisation Der
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Ehemaligen SS Angehörigen, known as ODESSA.11 However, when the first period of
heavy pillage of the remnants of Nazi science and industry ended, and hostility among
the former Allies rose, the first signals of a change in a focus of the intelligence activi-
ties emerged. When the Central Intelligence Agency, abbr. CIA12 was founded, the
whole of forces and means was concentrated on a major intelligence front located terri-
torially on the occupied German areas. On both sides there were the aforementioned
CIA and its Soviet counterpart, NKWD (after 1954 the KGB, Komitiet gosudar-
stwiennoj biezopasnosti pri Sowietie Ministrow SSSR13). Support to both sides located
on territories of a later East and West Germany was given by Intelligence Services of
other allied countries. Thus, the presence of the British MI-614 and French SDECE
(Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-espionnage), both in GDR and in
FRG, was justified. The aims of intelligence and spy activities on a territory of divided
Germany included basic observation of a military activity of here gathered army forces,
either communistic or belonging to NATO. That was quite a strategic type of an activ-
ity, since both sides, in the face of a conflict between East and West, regarded Europe
and the territory of divided Germany as a potential major front in a case of a full scale
conflict. This was closely connected with a process of collecting data concerning
a level of training of necessary army units, their dislocation, places of collecting materi-
als to meet the need of a full quality logistic service. Another vital aim was to collect in-
formation about the latest types of armaments and weapons, delegated by both sides to
quasi-front units stationing in GDR and FRG. Such activities were fulfilled by both
civil Intelligence Services and army intelligence formations. In the analysis of the ac-
tivities directed on an examination of a defensive potential of both sides, one can find in
interesting that a common phenomenon was to accept, almost throughout the period of
the Cold War, the so-called Potsdam Missions, which were de facto a legalised form of
espionage. At the same time, both sides were striving for a recruitment of civil agents
whose main advantage was an access to information in the field of policies pursued by
a hostile side. To make such spy activities easier, a not completely guarded border be-
tween East and West Germany, as well as a division of Berlin into occupation areas
were destined. It was only after a foundation of a Berlin Wall when a steady infiltration
was broken, also thanks to successful process of sealing the borders conducted by Ger-
man border services appointed to this task by all forces sharing the borderline. Divided
Germany was a place of the most difficult spy operations for the major intelligence
agencies in the world. On the one hand, making contact through Berlin was available,
but on the other hand, Counter-intelligence Services were monitoring all the time, with
all due intensity, a territory which could be potentially used for spy operations. What is
more, after a further extension of GDR and FRG, the biggest possible amount of data
about the capabilities of both German states had to be collected. Due to a dynamic de-
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velopment of FRG, especially with regard to economy and new innovative technolo-
gies, a branch of industrial intelligence was activated. Until the end of The Cold War,
the CIA and the KGB/GRU had regarded their posts in GDR and FRG as a front ones.
Thus, the best possible staff was delegated to serve there. When it comes to Berlin
though, apart from Swiss or Finnish cities, Berlin was a very place considered a symbol
of a war between Intelligence Services.15 Significantly enough, the territory of the two
German states was classified as a area of a potential battlefield of World War III. There-
fore, every piece of information about infrastructure, population, concentration of army
forces etc. were considered vital, which further determined the intensity of intelligence
and spy activities. An interesting case though, one of the most secret affairs in the age of
the Cold War, was a process of creating a intelligence backroom and logistic bases on the
territory of FRG by the KGB and the GRU agents.16 These bases were supposed to be
used during redeployment of the Specnaz GRU and the KGB, whose soldiers underwent
a set of preparation procedures concerning an attack on the key FRG and the United
States’ military, political and industrial installations, which were located in the West Ger-
many.17 Their actions were supposed to be coordinated and supported by the KGB and
GRU residents in FRG, both these official and these who operated in so-called illegal, so
agents who had no diplomatic immunities. The Glienicke Bridge in Berlin became, so to
speak, a symbol of spy wars led on the German territory. It was a very place where many
exchanges of the captured spies took place. One of the most famous exchanges was com-
pleted in 1985, when Marian Zacharski and two other Eastern spies were exchanged for
another 25 (!) people who fell under the interest of Western governments.
THE NEW PLAYERS (BND, BFV AND MFS) – THE BEGINNINGS
OF AN INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
When the two German states were built, the new subjects in the international intelli-
gence game were born on both sides of the so-called Iron Curtain. Two independent
organizations were founded in FRG – an intelligence agency called the Federal Intelli-
gence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND)18 and a counter-intelligence agency
called The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für
Verfassungsschutz, BfV).19 The strongest position belonged to the BND formed exactly
on April 1st, 1956. The foundations of the new West German Intelligence Services
were laid by the United States of America. The CIA permitted further use of a spy
ring of Maj. Gen. Reinhard Gehlen which comprised of agents re-recruited after
World War II. Reinhard Gehlen20 himself had great spy and analytical experience,
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since he alone worked out the Soviet powers on The Eastern Front during World
War II.21 After the fall of The Third Reich Gehlen skillfully ensured himself survival in
post-war conditions, since all the data he had collected were made a bargaining counter
in negotiations with the Western Allies. These materials, both in a form of data and in
a form of intelligence contacts of Gehlen, were finally, after a year of a negotiating pro-
cess, passed on to the American party. Besides, the American party allowed to form an
independent Western Germany new intelligence agency, later called the Gehlen Orga-
nization.22 Its scope of activities was centred around surveillance of the eastern occupa-
tion area and collecting personal information sources from the eastern runaway groups.
What is more, a group of sleeper agents previously operating on the territory of The
Third Reich and the Soviet occupation zone was reactivated. The major task was to col-
lect information about the armed forces of the USSR. The basic problem was in func-
tioning of the Gehlen Organization was, however, natural reliance on a staff of the
former Nazi Germany. The Organization was accused of possible concealment of the
Nazi war criminals, coming either from Gestapo or from SD Intelligence Services,
through their activation in spy activities for the USA. Besides, connections between the
Gehlen Organization and the American Intelligence Services from 1946 to 1956 were
an extremely controversial issue. At the very beginning, Gehlen and his spy rings were
subordinate to the U.S. Army intelligence but when the CIA was formed in 1947 some
competence frictions emerged. Since 1949 CIA had taken full control over the Gehlen
Organization. What became a foundation for a new FRG – BND intelligence was the
very Gehlen Organization. What also needs to be stated is the fact, that the BND took
over even a headquarters of the Organization, located in a small village in Pullach, close
to Munich. After its formation, the BND got subjugated directly to the post of the FRG
Chancellor. This move was justified mainly by a close relationship between R. Gehlen
and Konrad Adenauer. When it comes to an assessment of BND’s efficiency in the pe-
riod of The Cold War, opinions differ. What usually came to light were the situations
unfavourable for the West Germany intelligence agencies. The most negative light was
cast by cases of activities led by deep cover agents, in espionage jargon the so-called
moles, who operated in trouble areas of the BND structures. One of such moles was, for
example, Heinz Felfe, responsible for counter-intelligence activities in a Soviet direc-
tion, arrested in 1961 on a charge of espionage for USSR.23 Some opinions are voiced,
e.g. among the former East German or Soviet agents, that a level of surveillance of the
BND by eastern services was high. One can also assume that the CIA kept the BND un-
der surveillance, using earlier supervision over the Gehlen Organization. To prove low
effectiveness of the BND was also the fact that the organization did not gather any im-
portant personal information sources such as, for instance, Oleg Gordijewski24 (British
intelligence) or Col. Ryszard Kukliñski (American intelligence). At the same time,
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a BND’s counterpart in the East Germany could place the FRG Chancellor at a very top
of a power hierarchy. Some limitations in the BND’s activities were caused by compe-
tence disputes with the BfV counter-intelligence. The BfV was formed in the nineteen
fifties and was based on a British counter-intelligence model. Similarly to the BND, the
West German Counter-intelligence Sevices BfV were famous for their ineffective ac-
tions. The BfV frequently had to cover its scandalous mishaps or incompetent coun-
ter-intelligence control wielded over the most important state institutions. Obviously it
is vital to stress that, unlike its counterpart in GDR, the BfV was forced to operate in an
environment which was especially tough to lead counter-intelligence activities – the
environment of a democratic country.25 However, only a mention about the most im-
portant cases which ended in defeat gives a picture of how poor was a FRG’s coun-
ter-intelligence security status. In 1954 dr. Otto John, a former head of the FRG
Counter-intelligence Services, got kidnapped or, in reality, re-recruited by the Stasi and
the Soviet intelligence. Another well-know example of infiltration of the BfV by the
West German intelligence was a case of Hans Joachim Tiedge.26 Tiedge was a member
of a FRG’s counter-intelligence from 1966 to 1985, the year when he fled to GDR and
disclosed his activities in the agency and the cases of passing on secret information to
the East German Intelligence Services. After 1990 it turned out that activities similar in
kind to these fulfilled by Tiedge were performed by Klaus Kuron,27 a person responsi-
ble in the BfV for a re-recruitment process of the East German spies. Apart from an ob-
vious weakness proven by the example of infiltration of one’s own structures, the BfV
could not prevent hostile activities led against FRG’s federal institutions. The most
well-known scandal was an introduction of Günther Guillaume to a secretarial office of
the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt by the Stasi.28 How-
ever, one can also mention a case of Gabriele Gast, who was responsible for a prepara-
tion of intelligence data for the chancellor Helmut Kohl. A desertion of Tiedge was
particularly painful for the West German intelligence community and this act fueled
a process of changes in a structure and staff of the BND and the BfV. Apart from civil
intelligence and counter-intelligence, right when the World War II ended and the new
state was established, FRG was a territory to re-create the armed forces and military In-
telligence Services in 1956 – Amt für Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (ANBw).29 To
comment on the real activities of the ANBw and the effectiveness of this agency is
barely possible, since even basic data is missing. What is more, the ANBw was concen-
trated on strictly military activities in order to compete with the BND and the BfV for
influence. While assessing the BND’s activities from the period of the Cold War one
can assume that the West German intelligence was a weaker partner of the CIA or the
MI6. However, it gave the FRG’s authorities, the Chancellor in particular, a possibility
to collect important data, especially on GDR level. There is also circumstantial evi-
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dence that the BND was engaged in the activities covering some prominent former Na-
zis, hiding in South America. What is more, the BND quite possibly possessed
a developed spy and informational net in the Middle East, at least at the beginning of its
existence. Thus, one should assume that the BND had to cooperate in certain fields with
the national intelligence agency of Israel called Mossad. These fields could include fi-
nancial support or armament deliveries for Israel offered by the FRG (especially in be-
tween 1959–1967). Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Services from the GDR stood
in complete contrast to the West German intelligence community. Ministerium für
Staatssicherheit MfS, better known as the Stasi,30 was a final effect of a strict supervi-
sion of the Soviet Intelligence Services. The Ministry for State Security of GDR
– MfS, founded in April 1950, was supposed to fulfill both intelligence and coun-
ter-intelligence missions.31 The Ministry comprised of minor intelligence and police
organizations, operating close to the Soviet structures. The first problems of MfS were
closely intertwined with gathering suitable staff. Soviet founders favoured mainly
agents who completed a training course in Soviet training centres. A so-called class cri-
terion was also preserved. An example of the first Chekists, as the employees of the
MfS called themselves, was Erich Mielke.32 It is important to mention, that army expe-
rience was acquired also by a group of the East German intelligence services officers,
e.g. Ernst Wollweber, in the mission during the Spanish Civil War. However, also this
time a part of the former Third Reich Intelligence Services staff was enlisted. While the
GDR was developing, however, new staff was created, with better educated and better
trained to a foreign intelligence service agents. A symbol of intelligence operations of
the times became Markus Wolf.33 Wolf took a charge in a special MfS’s foreign intelli-
gence structure called Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung HVA. His work and activities
which he supervised included concerned not only the FRG, but also the USA and other
countries of the world. It can be stated that in every place where diplomatic posts of
GDR were located, HVA’s posts were located accordingly. The HVA’s structures suc-
cessfully infiltrated all FRG institutions and their biggest success was to introduce
aforementioned Günther Guillaume in the closest decisive circle of Willy Brandt.34
Thanks to Guillaume’s work as a secretary of the FRG Chancellor, the MfS not only
collected secret data, but also enable the GDR authorities to properly pursue policies
concerning relations with the FRG. The HVA was famous for its excellent training to
gather personal information sources, e.g. during the Romeo operation, under which
male agents were sent in order to seduce and recruit potentially important women work-
ing for the FRG. When the Cold War ended and Germany were reunited, the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany proclaimed, with a ratio of votes of 5 to 3, that super-
vision over intelligence activities against the West cannot constitute a ground for legal
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proceedings against the HVA agents. Effectiveness was decidedly a characteristics of
the Stasi Counter-intelligence Services. The GDR was a police state, due to the fact of
which all the activities performed by foreign Intelligence Services were strictly moni-
tored. According to data available in “The Spy Book”, short before the reunification,
90,000 full-time workers, both in civil and uniformed services, were employed by the
Stasi. What is more, the Stasi developed an enormous, even when considering favour-
able conditions in Communist Bloc, net of agents and informers, comprising of, at
a rough estimate, 170,000 members. Apart from sophisticated operations with personal
sources, the MfS invested also in many various technological solutions connected with
wiretap, bugging or radio watch devices.35 An interesting example of how the MfS con-
trolled and infiltrated the society was a process of collecting scents and smells of dissi-
dents and people suspected of hostile activities. Of course, unlike the HVA, after the
reunification of Germany Counter-intelligence Services and the Security Services were
struck by a wave of screening and a series of legal and court proceedings on a charge of
illegal actions aimed at the opposition and the citizens suspected of anti-governmental
actions. A great success of the FRG was, undoubtedly, gaining access to a vast array of
files and records of the MfS and even recreation of the ones which were destroyed. To
complete this task a special office was destined, called Bundesbeauftragte für die
Unterlagern des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik (BStU), informally known as the Gauck Institute.
CURRENT AIMS OF FRG INTELLIGENCE
Contemporary FRG intelligence is directed and controlled by the BND, with the
posts in Pullach and Berlin. The aim of intelligence and analytical activities conducted
by the FRG Intelligence Services is two-fold. First, it collects information necessary to
pursue foreign policies. Second, it has to ensure national security and maintain the sur-
vival of the state.36 Nowadays, the BND cooperates with other Intelligence Services
both from Europe and from the USA, especially with a mutual aim to fight terrorism
and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has to be mentioned
that the terrorist phenomenon was used in the period of the Cold War to destabilise the
FRG. Both Soviet and East German Intelligence Services inspired, offered financial
and material support, gave shelter and carried out training for various extreme leftist
terrorists, e.g. from RAF.37 At the turn of the 21st century, a major threat the BND has to
face comes from Islamic terrorist groups and some international extreme rightists, e.g.
Combat 18 or Blood and Honour, connected with the groups operating in the FRG. One
cannot forget, however, about a basic function of the Intelligence Services which is es-
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pionage and political intelligence. A permanent object of the BND’s focus is, quite pos-
sibly, Poland, alike other countries which border Germany. The operations carried out
in Poland can include various fields of political, military and economic activity, due to
close relations between the two countries. Many organizations and foundations can be
useful for German intelligence in a process of collecting intelligence data. Contempo-
rary German intelligence is able, as it has already proven by the example of Reinhard
Gehlen, to make use of intelligence backroom connected with the East German Intelli-
gence Services. Undoubtedly, every more significant FRG post in the world, also in Po-
land, has to be filled with standard intelligence residents, whose responsibilities and
tasks concern the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT or TECHINT.
Nowadays, the BfV Counter-intelligence Services, apart from a basic conducting
and ensuring counter-intelligence security procedures, attach great weight to dangers
whose origin lies in a development of many forms of radicalism in the FRG. Separate
departments have been specially designed to deal with leftist and rightist radicalism,
possible subversive activities carried out by foreigners, and problem of Islamic terrorist
attacks. It has to be emphasised though, that it is the FRG which has become a place to
collect funds and potential candidates to carry out terrorist attacks for Al-Quaeda and
other associated organizations. It cannot be ruled out, however, that many more direct
attempts at terrorist attacks will finally hit the FRG if the state’s participation e.g. in the
war in Afghanistan grows. The BfV has to fulfill a difficult task of providing coun-
ter-intelligence security and safety, due to a rise in activity of the Russian and Chinese
Intelligence Services.38 Russian intelligence, which has a vast experience of operating
on the German territory, quite possibly aims at collecting information about the fields
important for the Russian Federation policies – vide mutual activities concerning en-
ergy policies and the so-called activities of an agent of influence. Many European
Counter-intelligence Services have already signaled an increased activity of the Rus-
sian intelligence in Europe. Yet another significant threat for the BfV to cope with is an
activity of the Chinese intelligence. In 21st century, a special meaning has been attached
to Chinese industry intelligence, concentrated on collecting data concerning technolog-
ical solutions which has been adopted by the German industry. Needless to say, that
Germany has become the biggest partner of dynamically developing China.
* * *
An experience which stems from the observation of the activities of the Intelligence
Services operating on the German territory indicate, that every state in the world, which
is a contact point for possible confrontation of stronger subjects, becomes an object of
focus for many Intelligence Services. Therefore, it is important to, apart from develop-
ing partner relations with other countries, strive for the best possible protection of the
country’s own interest. This should be achieved both on an intelligence and coun-
ter-intelligence level. Most importantly, a country must not let a period of financial or
staff weakness to happen. What is more, it is vital to always maintain a motivation level
of intelligence and counter-intelligence agents and analysts as high as possible. Even
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during periods of the so-called relaxation trend in the international situation, a special
importance has to be attached to ensure security of the crucial political and economic
national institutions. What is more, foreign infiltration has to be counteracted by all
possible means. A case similar in character to this of Günther Guillaume can not only
destabilise state machinery even in fixed democratic conditions, but also pose a country
to a threat of great financial loss. To conclude, Germany is no more a basic front coun-
try in contemporary intelligence wars but has remained an aim of some intelligence op-
erations. At the same time, contemporary German Intelligence Services have become
an active and powerful tool of their country. Together with a rise of international posi-
tion and an extension of German interest, whole Europe have been observing a grow in
intelligence security measures aimed at supporting state’s activities. However, the most
demanding challenge for contemporary German Intelligence Services is to fight terror-
ism, which is especially difficult to trace in a open and multicultural society.
ABSTRACT
After 1945 the most important everyday mission performed on the border between the cold
and the hot war was, however, the one fulfilled by forces which belonged to a less visible but still
extremely important formation – namely the Intelligence Services, Counter-intelligence Ser-
vices and, above all, their agents and analysts. While a cold-war tension was rising and the two
German states were built, a territory of the current Federal Republic of Germany turned into one
of the biggest fronts of world espionage. An experience which stems from the observation of the
activities of the Intelligence Services operating on the German territory indicate, that every state
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NIEMCY PO 1945 ROKU
– KLUCZOWY FRONT ZIMNOWOJENNEGO STARCIA S£U¯B SPECJALNYCH
STRESZCZENIE
Po zakoñczeniu II wojny œwiatowej, na najbardziej widocznym pograniczu zimnej wojny,
dziel¹cym Europê na dwie czêœci, najwa¿niejsz¹, codzienn¹ misjê pe³ni³y si³y nale¿¹ce do for-
macji mniej rozpoznawalnych od wielkich jednostek wojskowych, ale niezmiernie wa¿nej
– mianowicie wywiady, kontrwywiady, a przede wszystkim ich poszczególni agenci oraz anali-
tycy. Wraz z narastaniem napiêcia zimnowojennego oraz budow¹ dwóch pañstw niemieckich,
terytorium obecnej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec, przerodzi³o siê w jeden z najwiêkszych do-
tychczasowych frontów œwiatowego szpiegostwa. Doœwiadczenia p³yn¹ce z obserwacji dzia³añ
wywiadów na terytorium Niemiec wskazuj¹, ¿e ka¿de pañstwo œwiata, le¿¹ce na styku poten-
cjalnej konfrontacji silniejszych podmiotów, staje siê obiektem zainteresowania ró¿nych s³u¿b
wywiadowczych. Dlatego te¿, nale¿y w sposób szczególny oprócz, oczywiœcie rozwijania part-
nerstwa z innymi pañstwami, d¹¿yæ do jak najlepszego zabezpieczenia w³asnych interesów
równie¿ na p³aszczyŸnie wywiadowczej oraz zbudowania przede wszystkim skutecznego w³as-
nego zabezpieczenia kontrwywiadowczego.
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